Jen10122
11-14-2003, 09:34 PM
Homeland defense officials yesterday partially lifted the cloak of secrecy surrounding a network of outdoor air-sampling sensors in 31 cities that is designed to warn officials within hours of any attempt by terrorists to release deadly microbes into the atmosphere.
By testing filters removed from the approximately 500 air intake sites in the cities -- which include Washington -- government scientists can determine whether an attack involving biological agents is underway and take emergency measures that could save tens of thousands of lives, officials said.
Because the sensors' filters must be transported to laboratories for computerized analysis that takes hours, however, the system would not be likely to save many of the people in the immediate area of a biological weapons attack, officials conceded. But it could allow officials to take steps to protect many others in the same city, they added.
"This warning will save lots and lots and lots of lives, but not all lives," said Parney Albright, the Department of Homeland Security's assistant secretary for science and technology.
Biological attacks ordinarily would not be detectable until days after they are launched, when symptoms first appear. Some pathogens, including anthrax, are not communicable, but others, such as smallpox, are highly contagious.
This sensor program, called Biowatch, is designed to detect a biological attack during the days-long incubation period so people can be evacuated and medicine and vaccines can be provided.
Department of Homeland Security officials continue to keep many details secret, including the number of sensors in the Washington area and each of the other cities, as well as their locations. Even the names of other cities in the program are confidential, they said, although officials in some places have publicized their presence.
Many of the biowarfare sensors are placed on preexisting air-sampling units set up by the Environmental Protection Agency. Yesterday, Homeland Security officials took reporters to one atmospheric testing unit near the Capitol, where they revealed details about the project's operations and equipment for the first time.
The sensor is housed in a metal box the size of a telephone booth, and it is checked several times a day by EPA contractor Wayne Robinson. Yesterday he opened the door with a key and removed two containers that receive air through pipes, one plastic and the other metal. He placed the containers in a plastic bag and drove them to a nondescript red-brick lab on a military base near Washington.
There, lab technicians removed small paper air filters from the containers and placed them in a computerized device that measured reactions occurring when certain chemicals were added. The technicians were looking for the telltale DNA signatures of each of the 10 or so pathogens of greatest concern.
If pathogens were detected, officials would scrutinize wind patterns in the area of the contaminated sensor and take action to protect people there.
A crude form of this $60 million-a-year program was first launched at the Salt Lake City Olympics in 2002 and in New York City. Then, earlier this year, as fears about terrorism rose with the approach of the Iraq war, Homeland Security, the EPA and the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention scrambled to implement the more refined Biowatch program.
It has had no "false positives," or cases of labs mistakenly concluding that pathogens were present.
But an unnecessary alarm was raised last month in Houston. Repeated lab tests detected the presence of tularemia, a deadly pathogen carried by rabbits. Soon, though, officials concluded there had been no attack.
Instead, the machinery had detected tiny amounts of tularemia naturally present in the atmosphere. Scientists had known tularemia is common in Texas but were not aware that it could be detected in the air. No one fell ill.
A similar program in postal sorting facilities has suffered frequent false positives, officials said, mostly because of faulty training of lab personnel. That was the cause of the false alarm for anthrax at a mail-sorting site in Anacostia on Nov. 5, they said.
Government scientists are rushing to develop more sophisticated equipment that automatically would provide an immediate warning of a biological attack, which could save the lives of many more people.
The Biowatch project differs from other programs to detect chemical attacks. Washington's Metro system and the San Francisco International Airport are experimenting with this kind of chemical sensors, and others are planned for Washington's MCI Center. The idea of these systems is to activate massive redirections of airflow to remove pathogens from crowds, officials said.
© 2003 The Washington Post Company
By testing filters removed from the approximately 500 air intake sites in the cities -- which include Washington -- government scientists can determine whether an attack involving biological agents is underway and take emergency measures that could save tens of thousands of lives, officials said.
Because the sensors' filters must be transported to laboratories for computerized analysis that takes hours, however, the system would not be likely to save many of the people in the immediate area of a biological weapons attack, officials conceded. But it could allow officials to take steps to protect many others in the same city, they added.
"This warning will save lots and lots and lots of lives, but not all lives," said Parney Albright, the Department of Homeland Security's assistant secretary for science and technology.
Biological attacks ordinarily would not be detectable until days after they are launched, when symptoms first appear. Some pathogens, including anthrax, are not communicable, but others, such as smallpox, are highly contagious.
This sensor program, called Biowatch, is designed to detect a biological attack during the days-long incubation period so people can be evacuated and medicine and vaccines can be provided.
Department of Homeland Security officials continue to keep many details secret, including the number of sensors in the Washington area and each of the other cities, as well as their locations. Even the names of other cities in the program are confidential, they said, although officials in some places have publicized their presence.
Many of the biowarfare sensors are placed on preexisting air-sampling units set up by the Environmental Protection Agency. Yesterday, Homeland Security officials took reporters to one atmospheric testing unit near the Capitol, where they revealed details about the project's operations and equipment for the first time.
The sensor is housed in a metal box the size of a telephone booth, and it is checked several times a day by EPA contractor Wayne Robinson. Yesterday he opened the door with a key and removed two containers that receive air through pipes, one plastic and the other metal. He placed the containers in a plastic bag and drove them to a nondescript red-brick lab on a military base near Washington.
There, lab technicians removed small paper air filters from the containers and placed them in a computerized device that measured reactions occurring when certain chemicals were added. The technicians were looking for the telltale DNA signatures of each of the 10 or so pathogens of greatest concern.
If pathogens were detected, officials would scrutinize wind patterns in the area of the contaminated sensor and take action to protect people there.
A crude form of this $60 million-a-year program was first launched at the Salt Lake City Olympics in 2002 and in New York City. Then, earlier this year, as fears about terrorism rose with the approach of the Iraq war, Homeland Security, the EPA and the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention scrambled to implement the more refined Biowatch program.
It has had no "false positives," or cases of labs mistakenly concluding that pathogens were present.
But an unnecessary alarm was raised last month in Houston. Repeated lab tests detected the presence of tularemia, a deadly pathogen carried by rabbits. Soon, though, officials concluded there had been no attack.
Instead, the machinery had detected tiny amounts of tularemia naturally present in the atmosphere. Scientists had known tularemia is common in Texas but were not aware that it could be detected in the air. No one fell ill.
A similar program in postal sorting facilities has suffered frequent false positives, officials said, mostly because of faulty training of lab personnel. That was the cause of the false alarm for anthrax at a mail-sorting site in Anacostia on Nov. 5, they said.
Government scientists are rushing to develop more sophisticated equipment that automatically would provide an immediate warning of a biological attack, which could save the lives of many more people.
The Biowatch project differs from other programs to detect chemical attacks. Washington's Metro system and the San Francisco International Airport are experimenting with this kind of chemical sensors, and others are planned for Washington's MCI Center. The idea of these systems is to activate massive redirections of airflow to remove pathogens from crowds, officials said.
© 2003 The Washington Post Company